ONLINE MISINFORMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH:FINDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE

ONLINE MISINFORMATION AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FINDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE

With Special Reference to the Pranit More ‘₹370 Biryani’ Controversy and the Samay Raina ‘India’s Got Latent’ Controversy

By Pushkar Tripathi

Editor- Kanishk Kr Singh & Adv. Komal

 

 

ABSTRACT

The rise of digital content platforms in India has opened a rich but contested space where the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) collides, with increasing frequency, against the equally important interests of public morality, individual dignity, and online accountability. Two recent controversies — the ‘₹370 Biryani’ episode involving stand-up comedian Pranit More and web developer Himanshu Jangra, and the ‘India’s Got Latent’ controversy involving YouTuber Samay Raina and podcaster Ranveer Allahbadia — have forced this tension into sharp public and judicial focus. Both incidents resulted in First Information Reports (FIRs) under the Information Technology Act, 2000, and provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and both triggered institutional responses ranging from police summons to Supreme Court intervention. This article critically examines these controversies through the lens of constitutional jurisprudence, traces the evolving legal framework for regulating online speech in India, interrogates the doctrinal adequacy of existing obscenity law, and assesses the appropriate constitutional balance between the right to expression and its permissible restrictions under Article 19(2). It argues that the regulatory response to these controversies — while not wholly unjustified — risks crossing into prior restraint and chilling effect territory, and that a principled, constitutionally anchored framework is urgently needed.

I. INTRODUCTION

Freedom of speech is simultaneously the most celebrated and the most contested of fundamental rights. In a democracy like India, it forms the bedrock of political discourse, artistic expression, and social critique. Yet it has never been — and under the Indian constitutional scheme, was never intended to be — an absolute right. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India guarantees to every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(2) permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions on this right on specified grounds, including public order, decency, morality, and defamation.1

The digital age, however, has profoundly complicated this calculus. The internet has democratised speech: every individual is now simultaneously a consumer and a producer of content. YouTube channels command audiences in the millions; a single viral clip can travel from a private comedy show in Gurugram to police stations in Assam, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh within hours. This is precisely what happened in the two controversies that form the subject matter of this article.

In early June 2025, video clips from a crowd-work comedy show hosted by stand-up comedian Pranit More — in which audience member Himanshu Jangra made remarks linking a dinner expense of ₹370 to an expectation of sexual favours from his date — went viral on social media. The episode, quickly dubbed the ‘₹370 Biryani’ controversy, triggered widespread public condemnation for allegedly normalising non-consensual conduct.2 Maharashtra Cyber Police registered an FIR against More, Jangra, and others.3

Similarly, in February 2025, a clip from the sixth bonus episode of the YouTube show ‘India’s Got Latent,’ hosted by comedian Samay Raina, went viral. The clip showed podcaster Ranveer Allahbadia posing a sexually explicit question to a contestant.4 The backlash was swift and severe. The Guwahati Police registered an FIR against Raina, Allahbadia, and others.5 Multiple complaints were filed across different states. The National Commission for Women issued summons.6 The Supreme Court of India, while granting interim protection from arrest to Allahbadia, imposed conditions including depositing his passport and restraining him from posting further content.7

These cases raise fundamental questions that go far beyond the personalities involved: What is the constitutional boundary of offensive speech? Can a court restrain future speech as a condition for bail or interim relief? What obligations do digital platforms and content hosts bear? And is the existing legal framework — drawn up in a pre-social media era — adequate to govern the digital public sphere of today?

This article attempts to answer these questions systematically. It proceeds in six parts. After this introduction, Part II sets out the constitutional framework. Part III surveys the statutory landscape. Part IV analyses the two controversies in detail. Part V examines the judicial response with particular attention to the issue of prior restraint. Part VI proposes a path forward, and Part VII concludes.

 

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: ARTICLE 19(1)(A) AND ITS LIMITS

A. The Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression

Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression. This right has been interpreted expansively by the Supreme Court to encompass the right to propagate ideas, the right to receive information, the freedom of the press, and — increasingly — the right to communicate over digital platforms.8

In Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161, the Supreme Court held that the right under Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to communicate information through any medium, including electronic media.9 While that case involved broadcast rights, its logic applies with even greater force to the internet age, where a single YouTube channel may reach audiences that rival traditional broadcasters.

Expression on digital platforms — including comedy, satire, crowd-work performances, and podcasts — falls squarely within the ambit of Article 19(1)(a). The Supreme Court affirmed in Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641, that freedom of the press is an aspect of freedom of speech, and that restrictions must be justified by the State.10

B. Reasonable Restrictions Under Article 19(2)

Article 19(2) allows the State to enact laws imposing ‘reasonable restrictions’ on the right under Article 19(1)(a) in the interests of, inter alia, the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence.11

The word ‘reasonable’ is not merely procedural — it imposes a substantive requirement. In Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118, the Supreme Court held that a restriction is reasonable only if it is not arbitrary, is proportionate to the object sought to be achieved, and is not excessive.12 The Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, further embedded the principle that any restriction on a fundamental right must satisfy the tests of proportionality, non-arbitrariness, and procedural fairness.13

The grounds of ‘decency’ and ‘morality’ in Article 19(2) are particularly relevant to the present controversies. However, these terms are not defined in the Constitution and must be understood contextually. In Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257, the Supreme Court moved away from the Victorian ‘Hicklin Test’ (which judged obscenity by its potential to corrupt the most susceptible minds) and adopted the ‘Community Standards Test,’ asking whether the average, reasonable adult in the contemporary Indian community would find the material obscene.14

C. The Doctrine Against Prior Restraint

One of the most significant constitutional doctrines at stake in the ‘India’s Got Latent’ case is the prohibition against prior restraint. In Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129, the Supreme Court struck down a pre-censorship order as unconstitutional, holding that the imposition of prior restraints on speech is presumptively invalid.15 This doctrine was later reinforced in Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896, where the Court held that while prior restraint is not absolutely prohibited, it can only survive strict constitutional scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest.16

When the Supreme Court, in the Allahbadia matter, ordered that no further episodes of ‘India’s Got Latent’ be aired as a condition of interim relief, it necessarily engaged with this doctrine — a dimension that has been critically noted by legal commentators and is examined in Part V below.17

 

III. THE STATUTORY LANDSCAPE: GOVERNING ONLINE SPEECH IN INDIA

A. The Information Technology Act, 2000

The Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) is the primary legislation governing digital activities in India. Section 67 of the IT Act penalises the publication or transmission of obscene material in electronic form, defining ‘obscene’ as material that is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest, or whose effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see, or hear the matter.18 The punishment for a first conviction is imprisonment up to three years and a fine up to ₹5 lakh.19

Section 67A deals with sexually explicit material and carries enhanced punishment. Section 67B addresses child pornography. Section 69A empowers the Central Government to block online content in the interest of public order, security of the State, or decency.20

Section 79 of the IT Act grants ‘safe harbour’ protection to intermediaries — platforms like YouTube — provided they act as mere conduits and comply with due diligence obligations. This provision was significantly read down in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 — perhaps the most important judgment in Indian cyberlaw — where the Supreme Court held that intermediaries are obligated to remove content only upon receipt of a court order or a government notification, and not merely on the basis of private complaints.21

B. Shreya Singhal: The Constitutional Watermark

Shreya Singhal deserves extended discussion because it shapes the entire constitutional landscape for online speech in India. The case challenged Section 66A of the IT Act, which criminalised the sending of messages that were ‘grossly offensive,’ ‘menacing,’ or likely to cause ‘annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will’ through online communication services.22

The Supreme Court unanimously struck down Section 66A as unconstitutional. The Court found that the terms used in the provision — ‘grossly offensive,’ ‘menacing,’ ‘annoyance’ — were vague and overbroad, incapable of precise definition, and therefore capable of chilling legitimate expression.23 The Court drew a critical distinction between three categories of speech: discussion, advocacy, and incitement. It held that only incitement — speech that directly and imminently causes a public order breach — can be restricted under Article 19(2).24

The significance of Shreya Singhal for the present controversies is twofold. First, it sets a high constitutional threshold that any restriction on online speech must meet. Second, it is a warning against vaguely worded criminal provisions being used to police speech that is offensive or uncomfortable but falls short of incitement.

C. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

With the coming into force of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), which replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the substantive criminal law framework for speech offences was carried forward with modifications. Section 296 of the BNS deals with ‘obscene acts,’ covering acts which are calculated to offend modesty or decency of persons.25 Complaints in both the ₹370 Biryani case and the ‘India’s Got Latent’ case invoked provisions of both the BNS and the IT Act.

D. The IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (IT Rules, 2021) created a three-tier regulatory framework for online content. Significant social media intermediaries are required to appoint grievance officers, ensure expeditious removal of certain categories of content, and maintain audit trails.26 The Rules also create content standards for OTT platforms, prohibiting content that is obscene, pornographic, or insulting or harassing on the basis of gender.

However, the IT Rules have themselves been a site of constitutional contestation. In Kunal Kamra v. Union of India, the Bombay High Court issued a split verdict on the constitutional validity of amendments to the IT Rules concerning a ‘Fact Check Unit,’ with the tie-breaker judgment ultimately holding the amendments unconstitutional as exceeding the authority granted by the IT Act.27 An appeal to the Supreme Court remains pending.

 

IV. THE TWO CONTROVERSIES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The ₹370 Biryani Controversy

1. The Factual Background

During a crowd-work comedy show hosted by Pranit More in Gurugram, an audience participant, Himanshu Jangra, recounted a dating anecdote in which he claimed he had spent ₹370 on a plate of chicken biryani for a woman, and subsequently sought sexual favours in return for this expenditure.28 More, as the host, was interacting with Jangra during this account. Clips from the show were posted on social media and went viral, attracting widespread criticism for allegedly normalising the transactional conditioning of sexual consent.

The controversy drew a response from authorities when the Maharashtra Cyber Cell registered an FIR against More, Jangra, doctor Sejal Pawar, and other unidentified persons at the Nodal Cyber Police Station. The FIR was based on allegations that the content posted and disseminated on online platforms contained remarks concerning women and consent that could attract criminal liability under applicable laws.29

Summons were issued to More, Jangra, and Pawar directing them to appear and record statements.30 More subsequently issued public apologies, acknowledging that he had failed to intervene when Jangra made the remarks.31 Jangra himself later stated that he had ‘improvised’ parts of his account and expressed regret over attending the show.32

2. The Legal Issues

The ₹370 Biryani controversy raises several layered legal questions. First, is the content of the video — specifically Jangra’s remarks as relayed in a comedy show — ‘obscene’ within the meaning of Section 67 of the IT Act or Section 296 of the BNS? The remarks, while deeply offensive to many, arguably did not constitute ‘obscene’ material in the technical legal sense, since obscenity under Indian law (as defined by Aveek Sarkar) requires a community standards test — whether the average reasonable adult would find the material appeals to prurient interest with no redeeming social value.

Second, what is the criminal liability of the host as against the participant? The FIR names Pranit More alongside Jangra. However, criminal liability requires mens rea — the requisite guilty mind. More’s failure to intervene may be morally criticisable, but establishing that he actively published or transmitted obscene content, as required by Section 67 IT Act, is a different legal question. A 2025 judgment of the Allahabad High Court has clarified that even ‘liking’ a post does not amount to publication or transmission under Section 67 — the person must actively share or distribute the content.33

Third, the case raises questions about the line between criminal law and social accountability. Public outrage — however justified as a social and moral response — does not automatically translate into criminal liability. The Supreme Court’s warning in Shreya Singhal about the chilling effect of vaguely applied criminal provisions remains directly relevant.

B. The India’s Got Latent Controversy

1. The Factual Background

‘India’s Got Latent’ is a YouTube talent show launched in June 2024 by comedian Samay Raina, in which contestants perform before a panel of celebrity judges in exchange for ticket proceeds.34 On November 14, 2024, an episode was filmed featuring Ranveer Allahbadia (widely known as ‘BeerBiceps’) as a panelist. This episode was aired on February 8, 2025, on Raina’s exclusive member-only YouTube channel.35

During the episode, Allahbadia posed a sexually explicit question to a contestant. Clips from the exchange subsequently circulated beyond the member-only channel, triggering widespread criticism, threats, and trolling.36 The backlash was immediate and institutional. The Guwahati Police registered an FIR against Raina, Allahbadia, Ashish Chanchlani, Jaspreet Singh, and Apoorva Makhija for ‘promoting obscenity and engaging in sexually explicit discussions.’37

The National Commission for Women (NCW) issued summons to seven persons, including Raina and Allahbadia, directing them to appear at NCW offices on February 17, 2025.38 Raina subsequently made all episodes of the show private on YouTube on February 12, 2025.39 Maharashtra Cyber Cell registered a case under the IT Act and summoned Raina for in-person statement recording, declining his request to appear via video conferencing from the United States.40

Allahbadia petitioned the Supreme Court seeking to quash or consolidate the FIRs and for protection from arrest.41 On February 18, 2025, a bench of Justice Surya Kant and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh granted him interim protection from arrest, stayed the FIRs filed in Guwahati and Jaipur, directed him to deposit his passport at the Thane Police Station, prohibited him from leaving the country, and — most significantly from a constitutional standpoint — restrained him and his associates from airing any further episodes of the show.42

Subsequently, in hearings in November 2025, the Supreme Court reiterated the need for a robust regulatory framework for online content, directed the Union government to draft fresh guidelines within four weeks after public consultation, and observed that self-regulatory mechanisms were inadequate to deal with harmful content.43

2. The Legal Issues

The ‘India’s Got Latent’ controversy presents an even more complex constitutional landscape than the ₹370 Biryani case. Several distinct issues demand examination.

The first is the question of multiple FIRs and the principle of forum non conveniens. The filing of FIRs across different states — Assam, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh — for the same underlying act constitutes what the Supreme Court has, in other contexts, called ‘FIR shopping.’ The court’s exercise of its power under Article 142 to stay multiple FIRs and consolidate proceedings reflects established doctrine from cases like T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181, which held that a second FIR on the same set of facts is generally impermissible.44

The second issue concerns the scope of liability for content hosted on a platform: Raina, as the host and creator of the show, faces legal exposure for remarks made by Allahbadia as a panelist. Under the safe harbour doctrine read into Section 79 IT Act by Shreya Singhal, an intermediary who does not exercise editorial control over content enjoys immunity. Whether a show host — who curates panelists and participates in exchanges — is more akin to a publisher than an intermediary is an unresolved and crucial question.45

The third and most constitutionally significant issue is the restraint on future speech. The Supreme Court’s condition that no further episodes of ‘India’s Got Latent’ be aired is, in substance, a prior restraint — restricting expression before it occurs. As noted in Part II above, such restraints carry a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality under Indian law. The court in Outlook India’s commentary on the matter framed the question sharply: can freedom of speech, for content said in what was essentially a closed-door setting, be taken away merely because portions of it were published by third parties on public platforms?46

 

V. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE: PRIOR RESTRAINT AND THE CHILLING EFFECT

A. The Problem of Prior Restraint in the Digital Age

Prior restraint — the preventive suppression of expression before publication — has historically been regarded as the most severe form of interference with the right to free speech. The rationale is that post-publication remedies (criminal prosecution, civil damages) are less dangerous because they allow speech to occur; prior restraint prevents it entirely, and prevents the public from ever evaluating the suppressed content.

In the digital context, prior restraint takes new forms: content blocking orders, takedown notices, and — as in the Allahbadia case — judicial orders restraining further publication as a condition of bail or interim relief. The Wire’s reporting on the November 2025 hearings noted that the Supreme Court itself acknowledged that existing ‘self-styled’ self-regulatory mechanisms were inadequate, while simultaneously pushing for a framework that critics fear could enable overbroad state control.47

The problem is compounded by the ‘chilling effect’ — a doctrine developed in American First Amendment jurisprudence but recognised in Indian constitutional law through Shreya Singhal. When laws are vague, or when enforcement actions are disproportionate, creators and publishers engage in self-censorship well beyond what the law actually requires. The Maharashtra Cyber Cell’s advice to citizens not to even ‘download or disseminate’ clips from the Pranit More controversy — warning that doing so could invite ‘strict legal action’48 — is a textbook example of a chilling effect in action, suppressing expression through the threat of legal consequences rather than through specific, targeted enforcement.

B. Proportionality as the Constitutional Standard

The Supreme Court has in recent years embraced the doctrine of proportionality as a core constitutional standard for evaluating restrictions on fundamental rights. In Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353, the Court articulated a four-pronged proportionality test: (i) the restriction must pursue a legitimate aim; (ii) the measures adopted must be rationally connected to the aim; (iii) the measures must be necessary (i.e., the least restrictive alternative); and (iv) there must be proportionality between the benefit gained and the harm caused to the right-holder.49

Applied to the present controversies: while the aims pursued by law enforcement — protecting public morality, preventing normalisation of non-consensual conduct, safeguarding individuals from offensive content — are undeniably legitimate, the question is whether the measures adopted (multiple FIRs, passport confiscation, restraint on future broadcasting, police summons for in-person appearance from abroad) are proportionate to the harm actually caused. This analysis will necessarily vary depending on the specific content at issue, but it is a rigorous standard that judicial and executive actors must apply in each case.

C. Platform Responsibility and Intermediary Liability

Both controversies also raise the question of what obligations fall on digital platforms. YouTube, as a significant social media intermediary under the IT Rules, 2021, is required to have a grievance redressal mechanism and to act expeditiously on certain categories of content. The IT Rules create a three-tier system: Level I (publisher grievance officer), Level II (self-regulatory bodies), and Level III (government oversight).50

In practice, however, the application of these rules to user-generated content on platforms like YouTube has been inconsistent. The Supreme Court’s observation in November 2025 that self-regulation has failed and that a fresh framework is needed — while directing the government to draft guidelines with public consultation — signals a period of significant regulatory change.51 The critical constitutional question is whether any such framework will be designed to target genuinely harmful content (obscenity in the technical legal sense, incitement to violence, etc.) or will be drafted so broadly as to capture offensive-but-protected speech.

 

VI. FINDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: A WAY FORWARD

A. Moving Beyond Moral Panic to Legal Precision

Both the ₹370 Biryani and the ‘India’s Got Latent’ controversies triggered what can fairly be described as episodes of moral panic — rapid, large-scale social condemnation that creates pressure on institutions (police, regulators, courts) to act visibly and immediately. Moral panic, as a sociological phenomenon, is not inherently irrational: both controversies involved content that many reasonable people found genuinely offensive and potentially harmful.

However, the law cannot be a function of the intensity of public outrage. The constitutional text requires that restrictions on speech be reasonable, prescribed by law, and proportionate. The filing of multiple FIRs across different jurisdictions for the same act, the issue of blanket advisories against even sharing content, and the imposition of restraints on future broadcasting as conditions of interim relief — these measures may not survive careful proportionality review.

B. The Urgent Need for a Clear Definitional Framework

The Supreme Court’s direction to the Union government to propose guidelines defining ‘obscenity’ for online content represents a meaningful step.52 Such a framework must, however, be anchored in constitutional principles: it must adopt the community standards test affirmed in Aveek Sarkar, it must distinguish between content that is merely offensive or distasteful and content that is genuinely obscene or harmful, and it must be developed through a process of genuine public consultation as the Court has directed.

In this context, the lesson of Section 66A is instructive. That provision’s vagueness — terms like ‘annoyance’ and ‘inconvenience’ — made it a tool for suppressing political criticism far more often than genuinely harmful speech, until the Supreme Court struck it down in Shreya Singhal. Any new framework must be drafted with precision, limiting its reach to content that causes demonstrable and serious harm, with robust procedural safeguards.

C. Host and Creator Liability: Distinguishing Editorial Control from Mere Facilitation

Both controversies raise the distinct question of when a content host or show organiser becomes criminally liable for remarks made by participants or guests. A principled framework should distinguish between: (i) creators who actively direct or script content; (ii) creators who exercise editorial selection and post-production control; and (iii) creators who provide a platform for others to speak without editorial oversight of specific statements.

The third category — which comes closest to describing Raina’s role as the host of a live panel show — most closely resembles the intermediary model that Section 79 of the IT Act was designed to protect. Criminal liability in such cases should be limited to situations where the host had specific knowledge of and intent to publish content meeting the legal definition of obscenity, and took no steps to prevent or remove it after gaining such knowledge.

D. Accountability, Not Censorship: The Right Balance

It would be wrong to read this article as arguing that offensive content on digital platforms should be entirely beyond legal accountability. There are forms of online speech that cause real harm — content that normalises sexual violence, that incites communal hatred, that constitutes harassment of individuals — and the State has a legitimate and important interest in addressing such harm. The content in both the controversies discussed here falls in a genuinely contested zone: offensive to many, arguably harmful in its normalisation of certain attitudes, but not clearly meeting the legal threshold of ‘obscenity’ as defined under existing law.

The constitutional balance lies in: (i) maintaining clear, precise legal definitions of impermissible content; (ii) deploying criminal law — the most severe instrument of State power — only for content that clearly meets those definitions; (iii) avoiding prior restraints on expression and focusing on post-publication accountability; (iv) allowing civil remedies and platform-level action for the contested middle ground; and (v) ensuring robust procedural safeguards, including judicial oversight of content removal and FIR consolidation mechanisms for multi-jurisdictional complaints.

 

VII. CONCLUSION

The ₹370 Biryani and ‘India’s Got Latent’ controversies arrived at a moment of significant flux in India’s regulation of online speech. They have provoked legitimate questions about public accountability, the responsibilities of content creators, the adequacy of platform oversight, and the role of law in shaping digital culture. These are serious questions that deserve serious legal analysis.

But the constitutional framework demands that the law’s response be principled, proportionate, and precisely targeted. India’s free speech jurisprudence — from Brij Bhushan to Shreya Singhal — has consistently resisted the temptation to use the instruments of criminal law as tools of moral enforcement. The courts and Parliament must navigate these controversies with that tradition in mind.

As the Supreme Court itself acknowledged in the November 2025 hearings, there is a ‘vacuum’ in the regulation of digital content. Filling that vacuum with a framework that is constitutionally sound — anchored in the community standards test, sensitive to the chilling effect, respectful of the prior restraint doctrine, and attentive to the intermediary liability questions raised by the digital economy — is one of the most important legal tasks of the present moment. The two controversies discussed in this article are not merely cautionary tales about individual content creators. They are a mirror held up to the State, asking how it proposes to govern the digital public sphere while remaining faithful to the constitutional values it is bound to uphold.

 

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FOOTNOTES

1. Constitution of India, 1950, Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(2).

2. The Tribune, ‘Rs 370 biryani remark: Maharashtra police register case against comedian Pranit More, others’ (June 2025). Available at: https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/entertainment/rs-370-biryani-remark-maharashtra-police-register-case-against-comedian-pranit-more-others/

3. LawBeat, ‘₹370 Biryani Row: Maharashtra Cyber Police Files FIR Against Pranit More, Himanshu Jangra, Others’ (June 2025). Available at: https://lawbeat.in/news-updates/370-biryani-row-maharashtra-cyber-police-files-fir-against-pranit-more-himanshu-jangra-others-1601189

4. Wikipedia, ‘India’s Got Latent’; Business Standard, ‘FIR against Samay Raina, Ranveer Allahbadia: The controversy explained’ (11 February 2025). Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%27s_Got_Latent

5. Business Standard (ibid); All India Radio (AIR) News, ‘SC agrees to hear Ranveer Allahbadia’s plea challenging multiple FIRs’ (14 February 2025). Available at: https://www.newsonair.gov.in/sc-agrees-to-hear-ranveer-allahbadias-plea-challenging-multiple-firs-filed-over-his-alleged-distasteful-comments

6. Deccan Herald, ‘NCW summons Ranveer Allahbadia, Samay Raina and others over offensive remarks’ (11 February 2025). Available at: https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/story/india%2Fncw-summons-ranveer-allahbadia-samay-raina-and-others-over-offensive-remarks-3400484

7. AIR News, ‘SC Grants Interim Protection to YouTuber Ranveer Allahbadia Amid Controversial Comments’ (18 February 2025). Available at: https://www.newsonair.gov.in/sc-grants-interim-protection-to-youtuber-ranveer-allahbadia-amid-controversial-comments/

8. Secretary, Ministry of Information & Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161.

9. Ibid.

10. Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641.

11. Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(2).

12. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118.

13. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

14. Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257.

15. Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.

16. Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 896.

17. Outlook India, ‘Supreme Court on Ranveer Allahbadia: Prior Restraint or Stifling of Free Speech?’ (25 February 2025). Available at: https://www.outlookindia.com/national/supreme-court-on-ranveer-allahbadia-prior-restraint-or-stifling-of-free-speech

18. Information Technology Act, 2000, s. 67.

19. Ibid.

20. Information Technology Act, 2000, ss. 67A, 67B, 69A.

21. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.

22. Information Technology Act, 2000, s. 66A (struck down).

23. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, paras 86–93.

24. Ibid, para 17.

25. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 296; see also Vajramandravi, ‘India’s Obscenity Laws: Ranveer Allahbadia Case, Legal Provisions & Court Rulings’ (2025). Available at: https://vajiramandravi.com/current-affairs/indias-obscenity-laws/

26. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, rr. 4–7; The Law Communicants, ‘Obscenity and content moderation on OTT/social: current rulings, compliance checklists for creators and platforms’ (October 2025). Available at: https://thelawcommunicants.com/obscenity-and-content-moderation-on-ott-social-current-rulings-compliance-checklists-for-creators-and-platforms/

27. Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (Bombay High Court); Wikipedia, ‘Kunal Kamra v. Union of India’. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunal_Kamra_v._Union_of_India

28. The Tribune, supra n. 2.

29. LawChakra, ‘Rs 370 biryani controversy: Maharashtra Cyber Cell Registers FIR Against Comedian Pranit More and Others’. Available at: https://lawchakra.in/legal-updates/maharashtra-cyber-cell-fir-pranit-more/

30. The Tribune, supra n. 2.

31. Daily Pioneer, ‘Pranit More Apologises Again in Rs 370 Biryani Controversy’ (June 2025). Available at: https://dailypioneer.com/news/pranit-more-issues-fresh-apology-in-rs-370-biryani-row-says-i-deserve-this-hate

32. Deccan Herald, ‘Himanshu Jangra says he improvised his dating story, regrets going to Pranit More’s show’ (June 2025). Available at: https://www.deccanherald.com/entertainment/himanshu-jangra-says-he-improvised-his-dating-story-regrets-going-to-pranit-mores-show-amid-rs-370-biryani-row-4038641

33. Obhan & Associates, ‘Legal implications of social media likes: Section 67 of the IT Act’ (December 2025), discussing Allahabad High Court judgment on Imran Khan case. Available at: https://www.obhanandassociates.com/blog/legal-implications-of-social-media-likes-section-67-of-the-it-act/

34. Wikipedia, ‘India’s Got Latent’. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India%27s_Got_Latent

35. Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, ‘Allahabadia v. Union of India’. Available at: https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/allahabadia-v-union-of-india

36. Ibid.

37. Business Standard, supra n. 4.

38. Deccan Herald, supra n. 6.

39. Wikipedia, ‘India’s Got Latent’, supra n. 34.

40. AIR News, ‘Maharashtra Cyber Cell issues 2nd summons to Samay Raina in India’s Got Latent row’ (18 March 2025). Available at: https://newsonair.gov.in/maharashtra-cyber-cell-issues-2nd-summons-to-samay-raina-in-indias-got-latent-row

41. Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, supra n. 35.

42. AIR News, ‘SC Grants Interim Protection to Ranveer Allahbadia’, supra n. 7; Outlook India, supra n. 17.

43. The Wire, ‘Free Speech at Stake as SC Pushes for Stricter Online Content Rules’ (28 November 2025). Available at: https://m.thewire.in/article/law/free-speech-at-stake-as-sc-pushes-for-stricter-online-content-rules

44. T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181.

45. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1, paras 118–121.

46. Outlook India, supra n. 17.

47. The Wire, supra n. 43.

48. The Tribune, supra n. 2.

49. Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353.

50. IT Rules, 2021, rr. 8–9; The Law Communicants, supra n. 26.

51. The Wire, supra n. 43.

52. Vision IAS, ‘Government to propose guidelines defining obscenity in online content’ (22 November 2025). Available at: https://visionias.in/current-affairs/upsc-daily-news-summary/article/2025-11-22/the-hindu/society/government-to-propose-guidelines-defining-obscenity-in-online-content